300 lines
9.3 KiB
Markdown
300 lines
9.3 KiB
Markdown
### Comparison
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## Recon
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```bash
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# PoC from Forward DNS dataset
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# This data is created by extracting domain names from a number of sources and then sending DNS queries for each domain.
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# https://opendata.rapid7.com/sonar.fdns_v2/
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cat CNAME-DATASET-NAME | pigz -dc | grep -E "\.azurewebsites\.com"
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cat CNAME-DATASET-NAME | pigz -dc | grep -E "\.s3\.amazonaws\.com"
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# https://github.com/99designs/clouddetect
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clouddetect -ip=151.101.1.68
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```
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**First step should be to determine what services are in use:**
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* More and more orgs are moving assets to the cloud one at a time
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* Many have limited deployment to cloud providers, but some have fully embraced the cloud and are using it for AD, production assets, security products, and more
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* Determine things like AD connectivity, mail gateways, web apps, file storage, etc.
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* Traditional host discovery still applies
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* After host discovery resolve all names, then perform whois
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**lookups to determine where they are hosted**
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* Microsoft, Amazon, Google IP space usually indicates cloud service usage
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* More later on getting netblock information for each cloud service
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* MX records can show cloud-hosted mail providers
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* Certificate Transparency (crt.sh)
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* Monitors and logs digital certs
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* Creates a public, searchable log
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* Can help discover additional subdomains
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* More importantly… you can potentially find more Top Level Domains (TLD’s)!
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* Single cert can be scoped for multiple domains
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* Search (Google, Bing, Baidu, DuckDuckGo): `site:targetdomain.com -site:www.targetdomain.com`
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* Shodan.io and Censys.io zoomeye.org
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* Internet-wide portscans
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* Certificate searches
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* Shodan query examples:
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* org:”Target Name”
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* net:”CIDR Range”
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* port:”443”
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* DNS Brute Forcing
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* Performs lookups on a list of potential subdomains
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* Make sure to use quality lists
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* SecLists: https://github.com/danielmiessler/SecLists/tree/master/Discovery/DNS
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* MX Records can help us identify cloud services in use
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* O365 = target-domain.mail.protection.outlook.com
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* G-Suite = google.com | googlemail.com
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* Proofpoint = pphosted.com
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* If you find commonalities between subdomains try iterating names
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* Other Services
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* HackerTarget https://hackertarget.com/
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* ThreatCrowd https://www.threatcrowd.org/
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* DNSDumpster https://dnsdumpster.com/
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* ARIN Searches https://whois.arin.net/ui/
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* Search bar accepts wild cards “*”
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* Great for finding other netblocks owned by the same organization
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* Azure Netblocks
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* Public: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=56519
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* US Gov: http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=57063
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* Germany: http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=57064
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* China: http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=57062
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* AWS Netblocks
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* https://ip-ranges.amazonaws.com/ip-ranges.json
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* GCP Netblocks
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* Google made it complicated so there’s a script on the next page to get the current IP netblocks.
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* Box.com Usage
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* Look for any login portals
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* https://companyname.account.box.com
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* Can find cached Box account data too
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* Employees
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* LinkedIn
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* PowerMeta https://github.com/dafthack/PowerMeta
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* FOCA https://github.com/ElevenPaths/FOCA
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* hunter.io
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### Tools:
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* Recon-NG https://github.com/lanmaster53/recon-ng
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* OWASP Amass https://github.com/OWASP/Amass
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* Spiderfoot https://www.spiderfoot.net/
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* Gobuster https://github.com/OJ/gobuster
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* Sublist3r https://github.com/aboul3la/Sublist3r
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### Foothold:
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* Find ssh keys in shhgit.darkport.co.uk https://github.com/eth0izzle/shhgit
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* GitLeaks https://github.com/zricethezav/gitleaks
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* Gitrob https://github.com/michenriksen/gitrob
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* Truffle Hog https://github.com/dxa4481/truffleHog
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## Password attacks:
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* Password Spraying
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* Trying one password for every user at an org to avoid account lockouts (Spring2020)
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* Most systems have some sort of lockout policy
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* Example: 5 attempts in 30 mins = lockout
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* If we attempt to auth as each individual username one time every 30 mins we lockout nobody
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* Credential Stuffing
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* Using previously breached credentials to attempt to exploit password reuse on corporate accounts
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* People tend to reuse passwords for multiple sites including corporate accounts
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* Various breaches end up publicly posted
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* Search these and try out creds
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* Try iterating creds
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## Web server explotation
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* Out-of-date web technologies with known vulns
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* SQL or command injection vulns
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* Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
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* Good place to start post-shell:
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* Creds in the Metadata Service
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* Certificates
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* Environment variables
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* Storage accounts
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* Reused access certs as private keys on web servers
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* Compromise web server
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* Extract certificate with Mimikatz
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* Use it to authenticate to Azure
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* Mimikatz can export “non-exportable” certificates:
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* mimikatz# `crypto::capi`
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* mimikatz# `privilege::debug`
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* mimikatz# `crypto::cng`
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* mimikatz# `crypto::certificates /systemstore:local_machine /store:my /export`
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## Phishing
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* Phishing is still the #1 method of compromise
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* Target Cloud engineers, Developers, DevOps, etc.
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* Two primary phishing techniques:
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* Cred harvesting / session hijacking
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* Remote workstation compromise w/ C2
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* Attack designed to steal creds and/or session cookies
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* Can be useful when security protections prevent getting shells
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* Email a link to a target employee pointing to cloned auth portal
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* Examples: Microsoft Online (O365, Azure, etc.), G-Suite, AWS Console
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* They auth and get real session cookies… we get them too.
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## Phishing: Remote Access
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* Phish to compromise a user’s workstation
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* Enables many other options for gaining access to cloud resources
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* Steal access tokens from disk
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* Session hijack
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* Keylog
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* Web Config and App Config files
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* Commonly found on pentests to include cleartext creds
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* WebApps often need read/write access to cloud storage or DBs
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* Web.config and app.config files might contain creds or access tokens
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* Look for management cert and extract to pfx like publishsettings files
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* Often found in root folder of webapp
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* Internal Code Repositories
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* Gold mine for keys
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* Find internal repos:
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* A. Portscan internal web services (80, 443, etc.) then use EyeWitness to screenshot each service to quickly analyze
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* B. Query AD for all hostnames, look for subdomains git, code, repo, bitbucket, gitlab, etc..
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* Can use automated tools (gitleaks, trufflehog, gitrob) or use built-in search features
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* Search for AccessKey, AKIA, id_rsa, credentials, secret, password, and token
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* Command history
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* The commands ran previously may indicate where to look
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* Sometimes creds get passed to the command line
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* Linux hosts command history is here:
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* `~/.bash_history`
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* PowerShell command history is here:
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* `%USERPROFILE%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadLine\ConsoleHost_history.txt`
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## Post-Compromise Recon
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* Who do we have access as?
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* What roles do we have?
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* Is MFA enabled?
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* What can we access (webapps, storage, etc.?)
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* Who are the admins?
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* How are we going to escalate to admin?
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* Any security protections in place (ATP, GuardDuty, etc.)?
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## Service metadata summary
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* AWS: http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/*
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* Google Cloud: http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/*
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* DigitalOcean: http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/*
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* Docker: http://127.0.0.1:2375/v1.24/containers/json
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* Kubernetes ETCD: http://127.0.0.1:2379/v2/keys/?recursive=true
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* Alibaba Cloud: http://100.100.100.200/latest/meta-data/*
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* Microsoft Azure: http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/*
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## Tools
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```bash
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# Non provider specific and general purpose
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# https://github.com/nccgroup/ScoutSuite
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# https://github.com/SygniaLabs/security-cloud-scout
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# https://github.com/initstring/cloud_enum
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python3 cloud_enum.py -k companynameorkeyword
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# https://github.com/cyberark/SkyArk
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# https://github.com/SecurityFTW/cs-suite
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cd /tmp
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mkdir .aws
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cat > .aws/config <<EOF
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[default]
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output = json
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region = us-east-1
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EOF
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cat > .aws/credentials <<EOF
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[default]
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aws_access_key_id = XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
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aws_secret_access_key = XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
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EOF
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docker run -v `pwd`/.aws:/root/.aws -v `pwd`/reports:/app/reports securityftw/cs-suite -env aws
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# Dictionary
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https://gist.github.com/BuffaloWill/fa96693af67e3a3dd3fb
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Searching for bad configurations
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No auditable items:
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• DoS testing
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• Intense fuzzing
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• Phishing the cloud provider’s employees
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• Testing other company’s assets
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• Etc.
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```
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## Cloud Labs
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**AWS Labs**
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* flaws.cloud
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* flaws2.cloud
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* https://github.com/OWASP/Serverless-Goat
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* https://n0j.github.io/2017/10/02/aws-s3-ctf.html
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* https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/cloudgoat
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* https://github.com/appsecco/attacking-cloudgoat2
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* https://github.com/m6a-UdS/dvca
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* https://github.com/OWASP/DVSA
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* https://github.com/nccgroup/sadcloud
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* https://github.com/torque59/AWS-Vulnerable-Lambda
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* https://github.com/wickett/lambhack
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* https://github.com/BishopFox/iam-vulnerable
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**GCP Labs**
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* http://thunder-ctf.cloud/ https://gcpgoat.joshuajebaraj.com/
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**Azure Labs**
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* https://github.com/azurecitadel/azure-security-lab
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